{"id":85247,"date":"2024-02-09T11:34:00","date_gmt":"2024-02-09T10:34:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/?p=85247"},"modified":"2025-08-07T13:33:26","modified_gmt":"2025-08-07T11:33:26","slug":"orders-on-an-unstable-foundation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/en\/english\/orders-on-an-unstable-foundation\/","title":{"rendered":"Orders on an unstable foundation"},"content":{"rendered":"
If populism threatens order, perhaps the stubbornness of reason can help<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
by Olaf Kaltenborn<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>
\n
Order, order: The venerable Chamber of the House of Commons, home of the elected parliament of the United Kingdom. Photo: picture alliance\/REUTERS POOL\/Justin Tallis<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\n
\n
Orders govern our lives and how we live together in society. But what are orders based on? And how can we protect them?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
John Bercow, former speaker of the UK\u2019s House of Commons, earned himself an almost legendary reputation as a very vocal disciplinarian: \u201cOrder, order!\u201d echoed his sonorous voice through the raucous House of Commons during the endless Brexit debates. His appeal was far more than just a call for more discipline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The former speaker\u2019s call for order protected the functioning of parliament and helped to validate it on many occasions. Bercow\u2019s actions were legitimate by virtue of his office, and he was able to resolutely enforce order even in these difficult hours, some of the most difficult that this parliament steeped in tradition had experienced in decades. He appeared to some as the last guardian of parliamentary dignity in an otherwise often undignified game, as the embodiment of parliamentary and thus democratic order. But what exactly do we mean when we speak of \u201corder\u201d?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Order \u2013 one of the most universal and at the same time most normative terms \u2013 is difficult to grasp. As regulated and regulating contexts of meaning and function, we are familiar with orders and words derived from order: We speak of orders of thinking, normative orders, divine order, world order, political orders, economic orders and office orders; but also of calls to order, public order departments, order mania, sense of order, etc. There are many orders in religious, military and educational systems, and arbitrary orders from above issued over the heads of those concerned. We can see order at work everywhere, often intricately woven and interconnected, as a fine fabric of our social reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
Orders are elastic<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Orders are not rigid; they constantly evolve and often prove to be elastic in relation to the reality they regulate, but not always. That is why philosophy, political science, sociology, law and economics, to name just a few disciplines, repeatedly focus on the concrete and abstract regulatory contexts on which orders are based. Ordinary law is also constantly expanding to include areas that may previously have been extraordinary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the sense of rule-based individual and societal shoulds and coulds, orders can always be charged with new meaning and new justifications; they are extended and supplemented and, more rarely, deleted or revised; but they can also fail due to their own nature or the reality that they claim to regulate or justify: Normative claims to the validity of orders and their scope may be doubted; conflicts are sparked by partially competing or self-contradictory models of order; orders can then even become dysfunctional; sometimes the sovereign is threatened by the excessive regulatory frenzy of a legislator who does not stop at any area of our coexistence, and \u2013 in the worst case \u2013 sees themselves as the embodiment of all political order. Non-codified orders also govern our lives, giving them normative content, form and meaning and serving as orientation: Values, practices, customs, traditions, unwritten cultural practices and attitudes \u2013 they are all based on obscure patterns of order which, however, unfold a sublime potency \u2013 are often not recognizable to outsiders in their regularity and are therefore exclusive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, one of the most effective patterns of order is language: It gives our thoughts, which are invisible to others, an understandable, informative form. The world of linguistic symbols is one of the most effective and powerful patterns of order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\nMany people took to the streets during the dispute over Britain\u2019s withdrawal from the European Union. John Bercow became a figurehead of the \u201cRemainers\u201d with his calls to order <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
Order from a phenomenological perspective<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Einer der Philosophen, die sich mit dem Begriff der Ordnung ph\u00e4nomenologisch gr\u00fcndlich auseinandergesetzt haben, ist der Philosoph Bernhard Waldenfels (zum Beispiel \u00bbOrdnung im Zwielicht\u00ab, S. 19\u201320): \u00bbWovon grenzt \u203adie Ordnung\u2039 sich ab? Wonach richtet sich \u203ader Vernunftsgebrauch\u2039? Fragen wir so, so scheinen wir in \u00e4hnliche Schwierigkeiten zu geraten, wie wenn wir in der Sprache \u00fcber sprachlose oder sprachfremde Erfahrungen verhandeln wollen. Wie in der Sage des Midas scheint sich alles alsbald in das Gold der Sprache zu verwandeln oder auch in das Gold des Bewusstseins, die W\u00e4hrungsart macht keinen gro\u00dfen Unterschied. \u00c4hnlich also auch hier. Das Ungeordnete w\u00e4re das, was der Ordnung vorausliegt und zur Ordnung gebracht wird. Man kann schwerlich auf die Annahme eines Zu-Ordnenden verzichten, ohne die Ordnung in eine pure Idee, in eine reine M\u00f6glichkeit zu verwandeln, die von einem konkreten Ordnungsgef\u00fcge, einer Ordnungsstruktur nichts \u00fcbrig lie\u00dfe. Dennoch haben wir mit dem \u00fcblichen Einwand zu rechnen, der uns an nicht zu hintergehende Voraussetzungen mahnt. Indem wir das Zu-Ordnende bereden, betrachten und behandeln, bewegen wir uns bereits im Rahmen einer Ordnung, dahinter k\u00f6nnen wir nicht zur\u00fcck, es sei denn um den Preis der Bewusst- und Kopflosigkeit. Wir k\u00f6nnen, so wie Kant seinen Rousseau verstand, \u00bbauf einen solchen Vorzustand zur\u00fccksehen, nicht aber auf ihn zur\u00fcckgehen\u00ab.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Die Perspektive, die Waldenfels in der Tradition von Edmund Husserl und der franz\u00f6sischen Ph\u00e4nomenologie er\u00f6ffnet, enth\u00e4lt eine Irritation f\u00fcr das verbreitete und oben dargestellte Ordnungsdenken \u2013 insbesondere f\u00fcr die politische Philosophie und Politologie: Versteckt sich doch gleichsam in jeder Geltung oder Rechtfertigung ein unhintergehbarer Rest, der nicht zu rechtfertigen ist; genauer gesagt: Das Verstecken erfolgt in einem Raum, der der Geltung und Rechtfertigung gleichsam unbegr\u00fcndet vorausliegt. Das wirft die Frage auf, was denn Individuen, Kollektive und Rechtsgemeinschaften \u00fcberhaupt dazu bringt, eine Rechtfertigung ALS Rechtfertigung zu respektieren und sie als F\u00dcR SICH geltend anzuerkennen? Woher kommt diese Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit, der moralische Imperativ eines Sittengesetzes wie bei Kant? L\u00e4sst sich diese allein aus einer gleichsam \u00fcberkulturell geltenden, regelbasierten Vernunft rechtfertigen? Oder gibt es nicht noch viele andere M\u00f6glichkeiten?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here is an \u2013 incomplete \u2013 selection:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 From the individual conscience as an \u201cinner judge\u201d? Conscience is regarded as a non-\u00adreason-based \u201chigher\u201d authority with reference to any kind of \u201chigher\u201d or \u201cdivine\u201d order, which, however, does not disclose the actual reasons for this order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022\u00a0From a reason-based insight into the recognition of an order that unites all? This presupposes an internal order of reason that unites all or an insight shared by all members of this order into the rationally justifiable reasons for this order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 From the letters and the inner logic of the text itself? The assumption here is that the vigilant reading of a generally understandable normative text that is accessible to all can itself trigger a compelling inner force for recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 From a traditional authority according to which we must abide by the law? In this case, recognition is based on a rather unreflected but effective legal authority, which is largely unquestioned by the subjects who feel they belong to an order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 Out of fear of punishment and sanctions for non-recognition? This, as it were, \u201cnegative\u201d insight and forced recognition do not result from \u201chigher insight\u201d (for example, reason, divine law), but from the fear of the sovereign imposing order on every subject under him or her, by force if necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\nCorrosive populism: Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a political party that tries to win votes above all through resentment. In the process, it pits itself against Europe, migrants and established parties.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
It is already evident from this cursory overview that orders \u2013 including political ones \u2013 often stand on a much thinner foundation than is commonly assumed, and they are bound in their effect and validity to conditions that they themselves do not (or cannot) contain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This reservation and the associated risk of the backsliding or even failure of orders (which do not result from the rational reasons of these orders themselves) can be clearly seen in our initial example, the calls to order of John \u00adBercow in the UK Parliament, who, like a tragic hero, a Don Quixote, tried to keep the Brexit debate in the House of Commons, which was toxic to democracy, in check. In the end, he stood little chance against a disorderly political populism based on lies and deception with the declared goal of Britain leaving the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Political populism draws its explosive strength first of all from a growing lack of justification and legitimization (\u201cby those at the top\u201d) of existing (reason-based) forms of order, which it continuously disparages (along with these orders\u2019 most important actors), foremost in the eyes of a minority, which is, however, gradually developing into an (apparent) majority. In doing so, it deliberately exploits the vulnerabilities of orders and their supporting actors as well as the open forms of discourse to its advantage, stokes \u201cfears of over-foreignization\u201d and \u201cdeep state fantasies\u201d or spreads lies and \u201calternative facts\u201d along with self-pitying utterances that its own position is being cancelled by left-wing \u201cstate media\u201d. The growing and persuasive mass effect does not result from a verifiable truth, but from the hundredfold public repetition of such narratives. Populist ideologies, with their increasingly refined communication techniques, aim to undermine the arguments for reason-based political thought and action and thus at the same time to disrupt the legitimacy of the democratically elected political actors and, ultimately, the legitimacy of democratic orders themselves. The legitimacy of democratic orders and the institutions that support them sometimes emerge from this \u00addramatically weakened \u2013 as in the USA after Trump, for example, but also in Poland, Hungary, Israel and Turkey \u2013 and similarly through former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his in some cases politically frivolous predecessors in the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But what can our democratic order do to counteract corrosive populist currents and infiltration tendencies?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\n
\n
IN A NUTSHELL<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 Orders are extremely complex. In every community or state, we have always lived \u2013 partly unquestioned \u2013 in a web of orders that overlap, complement and partly contradict each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022\u00a0The article approaches these different dimensions of orders selectively and presents some of their entanglements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022\u00a0In the second part, the article focuses on the risks posed to democratic orders by an increasingly widespread populism. What can we do about it? Researchers are looking for answers, not least from J\u00fcrgen Habermas.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
Here are several suggestions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Assume more journalistic responsibility: Especially in the media, there is often the questionable practice of allowing unproven opinions and populist narratives on an argumentative level and equating them with factual and\/or scientifically sound knowledge \u2013 for example in the climate debate. This practice \u2013 often due to time constraints and keeping ahead of the pack \u2013 should be reconsidered and corrected in the interest of disseminating knowledge that has been properly verified. Reasoning and fact-based verification is also a service to democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Explain and classify better: Democratic politics should consider a change in political communication, which is often highly ritualized and stereotyped \u2013 traditional patterns of representation are perceived by many as detached, abstract and unrealistic. This wastes the opportunity to make people aware of democratic decisions and the backgrounds to them and to win them over to democracy. Perhaps we could learn from the populists and their undisputed narrative skills \u2013 and apply these responsibly against a vicious and corrosive populism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Refute narratives: Continuously refuting populist narratives with arguments and facts is not only the constant task of journalism, non-populist politics and science. It is also the task of each individual not to remain silent when the occasion arises \u2013 in their personal environment too \u2013 but to take a clear and argument-based stand. The greatest tactical advantage, but also the Achilles\u2019 heel of populists, is often the nimbleness and speed with which they divert discontent about current developments to their political grist. The appropriation of the peaceful East German revolution of 1989 by the Thuringian AfD chairman Bj\u00f6rn H\u00f6cke is an example of this; the equating of the currently allegedly suppressed freedom of expression in Germany with the conditions in the GDR is another. In the context of \u201cWe did not demonstrate for freedom in 1989 only to have it taken away again by those now in power,\u201d H\u00f6cke cannot claim to be part of the \u201cwe\u201d \u2013 after all, he was a teacher in Hesse until September 2014. The inaccurate comparison is easy to refute: No one in Germany today has to fear state spying and prison sentences because of their political opinion, as was the case in the GDR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
More courage and \u201cNow more than ever!\u201d: Finally, let us consider J\u00fcrgen Habermas, who counters these worrying developments with a \u201cNow more than ever!\u201d that goes back to Kant. \u201c(\u2026) With few exceptions, the political elites allow themselves to be disarmed by an ideologically exaggerated social complexity and have lost the courage to shape politics. Meanwhile, national publics, dried up of almost all truly relevant issues, have turned into arenas of distraction and indifference, if not mutually fomented nationalist resentment. If we do not want to leave it at this gloomy diagnosis, we can learn at least one thing from a Kant enlightened by Marx: The mole of reason is blind only in the sense that he recognizes the resistance of an unsolved problem without knowing whether there will be a solution. But he is stubborn enough to continue burrowing forwards through his tunnels notwithstanding. Kant impressed this attitude on us at the same time as his insights \u2013 indeed, his philosophy consists of collecting good reasons for this attitude. And isn\u2019t that the greatest thing about his magnificently enlightening philosophy?\u201d (J\u00fcrgen Habermas, in: Forst, Rainer, G\u00fcnther, Klaus (eds.): Normative Ordnungen, Berlin (Suhr\u00adkamp) 2021, p. 41)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Last but not least, extensive research is currently underway into how social conflicts can be resolved constructively and how society can be held together. Goethe University Frankfurt hosts two major projects on this topic: the ConTrust research initiative and a section of the Research Institute Social Cohesion, a national institute with a decentralized structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>
\n
\n
The Research Institute Social Cohesion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Research Institute Social Cohesion (RISC), a decentralized organization spread over eleven locations, was founded on June 1, 2020. RISC\u2019s spokeswoman is Nicole Deitelhoff, Professor of Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt. Under the RISC umbrella, there are currently 83 research and transfer projects dedicated to social cohesion issues.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>
\n
\n
ConTrust Research Initiative<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trust and conflict are often understood as opposites. The cluster initiative \u201cConTrust: Trust in Conflict \u2013 Political Life under Conditions of Uncertainty\u201d is based on the idea that trust only takes shape in conflicts. Sometimes, however, trust in certain people or parties stirs up conflicts or cements them. ConTrust investigates the conditions for settling social conflicts successfully.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>
\n
\n
The author<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Dr. Olaf Kaltenborn, born in 1965, studied political science and journalism\u00a0 and was Press Officer at Goethe University Frankfurt until 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/picture-alliance_REUTERS-POOL-JUSTIN-TALLIS_RZ-banner.jpg\")
<\/span>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/shutterstock_1492620320_web-500x346.jpg\")
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/shutterstock_1400998292_T.B.photo_web-500x346.jpg\")
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/shutterstock_241650187_Foto_qvist_web-500x346.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n\n\n\n