In his new book “Gefährliche Rivalitäten” [Dangerous Rivalries], historian Werner Plumpe shows how history has always been shaped by economic competition.
UniReport: To ask a somewhat cheeky question – do we owe this book to Donald Trump and his second term in office?
Werner Plumpe: No, the book contract dates from December 2023. But Trump’s election certainly gave the topic additional urgency.
Is now a good time for historians to write books, given the volatility of our time and age? A lot is clearly happening – but are we already capable of categorizing these ruptures and shifts in world-historical terms? Put differently: Is Trump’s unpredictability a challenge for contemporary analysis, or should we refrain from overestimating his erratic behavior – maybe there are even historical precedents?
That’s a key point. Current events resist historical analysis, and historians are just as clueless about the future as everyone else. At the same time, however, the current “turbulent” times cry out for historical perspective, which might help to avoid overdramatizing events – especially in relation to Donald Trump, which is often the case today.
In your foreword, you write that while economic wars have been around for a long time, since the 17th century, they have increasingly revolved around strengthening one’s own productive capacity and weakening that of one’s opponent. Could you elaborate a bit?
Economic performance doesn’t just determine the supply of goods and services. In a world of nation-states, it also largely defines their capacity to act. So, in the competition between states, strengthening one’s economy and weakening that of real or perceived rivals became a matter of self-assertion. Being economically strong enough to secure one’s own existence and limit the options of competitors has been crucial to that. Economic warfare is instrumental in this sense: it uses the economy in the pursuit of political questions related to each actor’s scope for action.
The term “economic war” is essentially a metaphor, since these confrontations between states are not military in nature but conducted through economic means. Is that correct, or can economic war also include acts of actual warfare?
It’s fundamentally difficult to draw a clear line. The potential for escalation has always been immense. Trade blockades, sanctions, and boycotts can quickly escalate into open conflict. On the other hand, targeted violence that falls short of open warfare – such as privateering and piracy – has also been used to inflict material damage on competitors.
You write that we are currently experiencing a loss of order, brought about by the decline of a U.S.-dominated world (which you add was never an era of global peace). What could take the place of the Pax Americana? Who can uphold a new order? Could Trump’s “deal-making” be a new form of multilateralism in a disordered world?
Historically, phases of rule-based international economic cooperation – though still competitive – are rare. They usually occur only when a state is so dominant, like Britain after the Napoleonic Wars or the U.S.A. after World War II, that it can set the rules and incentivize others to maintain good relations with the economic hegemon. That’s a high bar – and the foundations of the Pax Americana have eroded in recent years, much like British dominance did before 1914. The danger is that today’s new multipolarity, in which there is no dominant actor, could trigger escalations that result in a major catastrophe. Seen in that light, Trump’s deal-making, i.e., tough economic diplomacy with the aim of eventually reaching agreements, might be a hopeful sign that such a major blow-up can be avoided. There are no guarantees, but history – like the persistent mix of boycotts, piracy, and wars, primarily between France and Britain, that characterized the pre-Napoleonic era and culminated in the great wars of the early 1800s – shows how much is at stake.
You argue that only large economies like the U.S.A. or China can survive protectionism through tariffs, because of their huge domestic markets. For an export-dependent nation like Germany, customs barriers thus hit particularly hard. With a view on Germany, you write that the more integrated a country is in the global economy, the less autonomous its actions can be. Is accepting this paradox essential?
Countries like Germany, the Netherlands, or Italy can’t wage economic wars because their economies depend too heavily on a global division of labor. The more trade, the more successful the economy – but the less room for autonomous maneuvering. World War I is an instructive example: the most effective weapon the Allies had was the blockade of Germany and its exclusion from the global economy. The Nazi regime’s push for autarky was economically irrational – it served only military purposes. For Germany’s economy to be successful, it requires open markets. That’s not always easy, but it’s ultimately unavoidable. Current talk of “becoming self-sufficient” is neither promising nor sensible.
In theory, cross-border economic activity without any economic warfare should benefit all participating countries. Or are there always losers?
Yes, and that’s what makes even functioning orders inherently fragile. Economic orders often accelerate structural change, from which the leading powers don’t necessarily benefit. Britain gradually lost economic weight during the Pax Britannica, just as the United States is doing now in the global order it itself created. Britain adapted to change, not least because it still did well economically despite its relative decline. The U.S. experience is different: its loss of influence relative to China is perceived as an existential threat – a perception that predates Trump and was shared by both Obama and Biden. While he uses different tools, Trump’s goals aren’t so different from those of his predecessors.
You argue that static conditions are the exception: in peaceful times, economic growth leads to new conflict; during economic wars, the desire for new order re-emerges. Elsewhere, you speak of the eternal paradox of order and rivalry. Can this constant dialectic make one both optimistic and pessimistic about the future?
There are no static conditions in economic change. Every new technology, every shift in transport costs, or redistribution of labor, capital, and knowledge alters the rules and shifts regional balances. Sustained order in such constant change is rare and depends on many conditions – to date, it emerged only after major wars with a single victor. But that is too high a price, which is why I personally prefer robust negotiation processes, even if they’re difficult and require a willingness to compromise.
So economic history does not support the idea of an “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama suggested in the 1990s?
Not at all. That’s completely unrealistic. Change never stops – and since economic power determines political influence, rivalries will persist. But as long as reason and level-headedness prevail, it is possible under certain conditions to avoid such rivalries from turning into dangerous conflicts.
