Political scientist Gunther Hellmann on the concept of the West, American domestic and foreign policy under Trump, and Germany’s future role in Europe’s security framework
UniReport: Professor Hellmann, this year’s Römerberg Talks focused on “the end of the West”. Some view the West emphatically as a community of shared values – a notion from which you distanced yourself in your lecture, correct?
Gunther Hellmannn: In his multi-volume “History of the West”, historian Heinrich August Winkler portrays the West as an actor, i.e. a subject that acts. By contrast, at the Römerberg Talks Sebastian Conrad spoke instead of a kind of mobilization narrative – a characterization I can connect with, especially by referencing political theorist Ernesto Laclau’s concept of the “empty signifier”. An empty signifier is a signifier without a clear signified – meaning it designates something that does not have any clearly defined content. This has many advantages. I believe this concept also this applies to the “West”: an omnipresent term without fixed meaning that is nevertheless frequently used and routinely taken for granted, even though it holds such a wide array of meaning. It is precisely this vagueness that makes the term ideal to mobilize political communities to act – or to refrain from acting. This has worked remarkably well over recent decades –not only in Western Europe and the expanded European Union plus the U.S. and Canada, but also in Australia, New Zealand, and even Japan. In this sense, it signifies a form of identification with a political community that transcends state borders and pursues not only common ideas and ideals, but also takes common political action.
If I understand you correctly, an added advantage of this empty signifier is that it is open to individual redefinition, as we are currently witnessing with the Americans’ insinuated retreat from the alliance. But we also heard many critical voices at the Römerberg Talks, who adopted a postcolonial perspective and questioned the West’s self-image.
Exactly. This empty signifier has no fixed meaning. Just as we, in the Western transatlantic context, associate many positive aspects with the West, postcolonial critics associate it negatively with colonialism, exploitation, and capitalism.
Were you surprised by the U.S. turning away from the West?
While the manner in which the Trump administration has acted in these early weeks and months was not truly surprising, the intensity and radicalism with which this agenda is now being very professionally pursued definitely was. In leaked communications about an attack on Yemen, Vice President Vance spoke extremely disparagingly about the Europeans. That has now become the dominant narrative, one that practically overturns everything we have experienced as a transatlantic community over the past decades. Vance’s visit to Greenland fits this pattern – a wholly unwelcome visit underlining Trump’s ambition to acquire Greenland “one way or the other”, or as he put it: “We’ll get it.”
Trump often speaks of “deals”. Does the notorious slogan “Make America Great Again” still convey any kind of political conviction?
Yes, it actually embodies a conviction that marks the fundamental opposition between a transactional or bilateral foreign policy approach on one side, and the classic multilateral orientation historically prominent in the West on the other. The multilateralism we have experienced since World War II, particularly through international institutions strongly supported by the U.S., is being turned upside down by this new transactional practice. A deal, after all, is about achieving an advantage for one of two parties. In this logic, the U.S. is the dominant power. In bilateral deals, Trump believes he can extract maximum advantages for the U.S. – which helps explain why he is so fixated on the European Union, the most successful institutionalization of multilateral cooperation in history. He struggles with the EU because it does not fit the bilateral deal-making mold, even though the EU, as a whole, negotiates bilaterally with the U.S. on trade matters. But Trump would prefer to deal with the weaker individual states, since this would shift the power imbalance clearly in favor of the U.S.
Looking at American domestic politics: Is it conceivable that Trump and his administration could cause lasting damage to American democracy?
Unfortunately, that is not entirely unimaginable. Everything we have witnessed in these early weeks of his presidency indicates that this dystopia must be taken very seriously. The rule of law is already being systematically undermined – just look at the way the administration deports migrants without granting due process, ignores court rulings, attacks judges, or pressures law firms. Unfortunately, some legal frameworks to support these practices have already been created: the Supreme Court, with its current conservative majority, has essentially granted Trump immunity from prosecution. Chief Justice John Roberts has shown some signs of regret over giving Trump such freedom. Recently, Trump even declared he was “not joking” when suggesting he might seek a third term in office, which is explicitly prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.
Why has the American public remained relatively calm? Are Trump’s opponents holding back because it is utterly unclear to them where his ambitions will end or whom he will target next?
The intimidation of potential opponents is already evident within the Republican Party: Trump has so far managed to close ranks both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives – a remarkable achievement given the narrow majorities. However, the big tests are still to come. What is surprising is how disorganized the Democratic opposition appears. Of course, the devastating electoral defeat was deeply disappointing, and initially may have robbed Democrats of finding their bearings. In addition to that, Trump’s demeanor exhausts his opponents. Be that as it may, it still is difficult to explain why no clear opposition strategy has yet emerged in Congress; something that goes beyond feeling intimidated. Significant Democratic gains in recent special elections in Florida and, above all, winning the Wisconsin Supreme Court election – despite Elon Musk’s attempts to bankroll the Republican candidate – may signal the beginning of a turnaround.
Back to the situation on this side of the Atlantic: Europeans now clearly need to do more for their own defense. The term “rearmament” is being used a lot more often than in previous decades. Doesn’t it pose a major challenge to convince the public of the need for such investments in military infrastructure? And what does this mean for the likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz?
If you look at survey data in Germany, three-quarters of respondents support better equipment for the Bundeswehr – even if it means incurring new debt. Almost half would still support higher defense spending even at the expense of cuts in social, environmental, or cultural sectors. I have noticed this shift among my students as well: the willingness to reconsider security policy and to take clear positions is much more pronounced than in earlier generations. Although clichés persist abroad that Germans are incurably “anti-militaristic”, I see a distinct mental shift towards recognizing that Germany must also assume leadership responsibilities in security policy within the European Union. Recently, Jürgen Habermas rightly emphasized in an article in Süddeutsche Zeitung that as Germany’s power becomes more visible in the military domain, it will become increasingly important to demonstrate both our reliability and our willingness to further integrate with European allies. Both aspects must go hand in hand. In this respect, the new government under Merz will face some major tests in the coming years.
As a political scientist, you operate in a media landscape where there is growing demand for military expertise – especially since the outbreak of the war against Ukraine. Is there a need for political science to realign itself?
We have already witnessed a noticeable shift over the past 20 years: Political science is now much more prominent in public discourse. Whereas security and defense policy issues used to be marginal topics in the media, this has changed significantly since Russia’s escalation of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. This shift constitutes an important opportunity and challenge for our discipline. A few months ago, I published an article about our self-understanding as political scientists in times of war. In it, I critically reflect on how we present ourselves in public. The time constraints on talk shows especially often make it impossible to thoroughly explain complex ideas. Faced with such conditions, we political scientists sometimes act too hastily. My point is that we must ensure that our topics are discussed in a differentiated manner, even in the media, and that our discipline’s internal standards are maintained. The current reality makes it clear just how much of a challenge this can be.
Questions: Dirk Frank
Prof. Dr. Gunther Hellmann is a Professor of Political Science with a focus on German and European Foreign Policy at Goethe University Frankfurt. He co-directs the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften’s John McCloy Transatlantic Forum and the interdisciplinary research initiative “Democratic Vistas. Reflections on the Atlantic World”, together with American Studies scholar Professor Dr. Johannes Völz.
Further Reading: Gunther Hellmann: Erwartungen, Bringschuldpflichten und Wissenskommunikation. Die IB und ihr Verhältnis zu Politik und Gesellschaft (nicht nur in Kriegszeiten). [Expectations, Obligations, and Knowledge Communication. The Discipline of International Relations and its Relation to Politics and Society (not only in Times of War)]. In: ZIB Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 31 (2024), Issue 2, pp. 138–164.
